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We analyze the relationship between fiscal deficit, macroeconomic uncertainty and growth for the 
period 1915-2006, and conclude that the deficit, possibly through the volatility in relative prices it 





                                                 
1 The ideas explored in this paper go back to Avila (1999). I am grateful for comments made by J. 
Streb and other members of the Economics Seminar at UCEMA. These views are personal and do 





The cause of Argentina’s economic decline, according to a commonly-held view, has been 
a blend of excesses: industrial protectionism, state-run monopolies, public spending, rapid 
monetary growth. In our view, however, the Argentine disease consists of an exceptional 
dose of uncertainty, in particular since the 70s. More specifically, our thesis says that the 
persistence of high fiscal deficits, financed by turns through inflation tax and foreign debt, 
generated a sequence of relative-price adjustments that made it impossible to make reliable 
evaluations of investment projects. This fact led to a fall in the stock of per worker capital, 
hindered technical progress and lowered per capita income. We advance three hypotheses: 
a) the fiscal deficit is an important source of macroeconomic uncertainty; b) uncertainty is 
an important cause of the Argentine economic decline, and c) causality runs from deficit to 
growth, and not the other way around. 
Several works provide rather traditional explanations for the Argentine decline in the 
20
th century. Cortés Conde (1997, I) heads in the right direction in trying to explain the 19
th 
century miracle, but goes astray in trying to explain the decline since 1930. Regarding the 
miracle, he argues that the end of the civil wars provided the political and legal stability the 
country badly needed to assert property rights and cut transaction costs, concluding that this 
achievement was the key factor behind the huge inflows of capital and labor resources that 
built modern Argentina. Yet in explaining the decline he points to mistakes in the import 
substitution policy and shortages of foreign exchange and domestic savings. Sturzenegger 
(1984) and Cavallo (1984) provide a suggestive explanation for the 20
th century decline but 
they do not provide one for the 19
th century miracle. Since the Argentine economy has been 
a mixed economy for most of the last century, Sturzenegger argues that its capitalist sector 
did not have real markets while the socialist sector did not have central planning; policy-
induced distortions worsened conditions such as competition, appropriability and certainty 
that markets require to work, while political instability worsened conditions for planning 
where markets fail. Cavallo stresses the impact upon the rate of economic growth of some 
static distortions (taxes, regulations, and trade barriers). He may be right in some sense: if a 
static distortion yields a once-and-for-all fall in the level of national income, a crescendo of 
static distortions may yield a long-run sequence of national income falls that looks like a 
reduction in the rate of economic growth. Sturzenegger’s work broadens this thesis until 
explicitly including the impact of dynamic distortions. 
According to the growth literature, a long-run increase in per capita income comes from 
investment in physical and human capital and basic research, from improved organization 
of production and trade, from quick and precise information. Most investments involves 
taking low-risk liquid funds, sinking them within a country’s borders, and betting that they 
will be recovered with at least some profit above their opportunity cost. So the depth of the 
horizon is critical. The collapse of fiscal accounts and the consequent uncertainty on the 
path of key relative prices distorts the intertemporal margins that govern investment. On the 
contrary, restrictions to international trade, lack of competition in large markets, and public 
spending beyond the social optimum do not have a direct impact upon the rate of growth of 
per capita income; they affect only static margins and provoke one-time falls in national 
income. 
Section I presents the empirical evidence. Historical and international comparisons let’s 
identify two correlations: 1) a positive correlation between the fiscal deficit and volatility in 
relative prices; 2) a negative correlation between volatility in relative prices and per capita  
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income growth. Section II develops a rationale for these correlations. The change in fiscal 
deficit financing from inflation tax to foreign debt, and from the latter back to the former, 
boosts changes mainly in the real exchange rate and the real interest rate; the relative price 
changes are needed for the country’s economy to adjust to budget innovations. Since risk 
aversion is a predominant trait in capital markets, such volatility creates a wedge in the 
capital market that hinders the process of accumulation. In the last section we summarize 
our findings. 
 
I. Empirical Evidence 
 
The purpose of this section is to explore statistically the thesis of the paper. To that end, we 
have to define uncertainty and measure it. We will link uncertainty to the volatility of two 
important prices in real terms: the exchange rate and the interest rate. We will then measure 
volatility using simple statistics (the variance or the standard deviation) for the respective 
time series. We will finally claim that a country undergoes a period of uncertainty when the 
relative price variance is high as compared to other periods in its history or other countries 
in the same period. So a relative price variance approaching zero will tell them that the flow 
of future income generated by an investment project could be valued at relative prices very 
similar to those prevailing at the time the decision is taken; on the other hand, a high 
variance will make present relative prices useless as a reference point. Thus we will say that 
a  country  is  economically  “predictable”  or  “safe”  when  its  volatility  index  is  low in  a 
relative sense. 
 
Table 1: Argentina, 1915-2006 
  Fiscal Deficit 
% of GDP 
Volatility 
Real Rate of Exchange  
Income per Capita 
Cumul. annual % 
 1915-28                     1.4                  0.4               1.5 
 1933-45                     3.3                  2.0               0.5 
 1946-58                     8.7                  8.1               1.4 
 1959-72                     3.0                  1.8               2.3 
 1973-90                   13.3                13.1              -0.8 
 1991-01                     2.0                  0.3               1.3 
2002-06                   -1.3                  0.6               6.0 
 
Notes 
a) Fiscal deficit: simple annual average of the imbalance in the consolidated public sector.  
b) Volatility: The volatility coefficient is equal to the variance in the series for the real rate of exchange 
divided by the statistical mean for the period. The real rate of exchange is equal to the US wholesale price 
index times the free rate of exchange (pesos per dollar) divided by the Argentine consumer price index. 
c) Growth in per capita income: to moderate the impact of the peaks and troughs of the economic cycle, 
we  have  calculated  the  cumulative  growth  rate  between  triennial  per  capita  income  averages  which 
correspond to the initial and end year in each period. 
Source: Calculations based until 1979 on data from IEERAL (1986); from then on calculations are based 
on Argentina’s national income accounts. Fiscal deficits for the periods 1991-2001 and 2002-06 were 
taken from Espert & Associates. Per capita income data up to 1990 was taken from Avila (1998) and 




Our thesis highlights correlations between fiscal deficit, volatility in relative prices and 
long-term growth of per capita income. As a first step to assess such correlations, Table 1 
shows Argentine macroeconomic performance in seven periods covering the last 90 years, 
and Figure 1 shows the paths of the fiscal deficit, the real-exchange rate volatility index and 
the growth rate as five-year moving averages for the period 1915-2006. 
 









































Deficit / GDP Volatility Yearly GDP % Var.
 
 
On the base of such annual data (Appendix) we have run three regressions to study in 
greater  depth  the  type  of  relation  and  the  existing  causality  between  the  fiscal  deficit, 
volatility and per capita income growth. Results are summarized in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Results of the regressions 
 
1)  ) 1 ( 63 . 0 ) 2 ( 23 . 0 ) 1 ( 31 . 0 95 . 72 36 . 32 AR VOL VOL DEF VOL + - - - + + - =  
          (-0.3)      (3.6)                 (2.0)                   (-2.2)                     (4.2) 
 
          R2: 71%    Prob. F-stat: 0.0000    D-W: 1.96 
 
2)  ) 1 ( 74 . 0 ) 4 ( 0007 . 0 ) 3 ( 0005 . 0 06 . 1 AR VOL VOL GRO + - + - - =  
        (1.5)    (-1.0)                         (1.3)                          (9.8) 
 




3)  ) 1 ( 69 . 0 24 . 0 44 . 2 AR DEF GRO + - =  
         (3.5)     (-2.7)            (8.6) 
 
          R2: 56%    Prob. F-stat: 0.0000    D-W: 1.86 
 
VOL is the five-year moving variance of the real exchange rate. GRO is the five-year moving 
average of the rate of growth of per capita income. DEF is the five-year moving average of the 
fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Regression 1 says the fiscal deficit is an important variable in explaining volatility. An 
increase in the mean deficit by one point of GDP increases mean volatility by 73 points or 
18%. The good correlation found by Nogués and Grande (2001) between the deficit and the 
Argentine-risk premium in the 90s supports this result. 
Regression 2 says the volatility index has little or no influence on per-capita income 
growth. The strong correlation found by Avila (2010) between the Argentine-risk premium 
and GDP since the late 80s up until 2006 does not support this result. 
Regression 3 says the fiscal deficit certainly does have an impact on growth. When the 
mean deficit increases by one point of GDP, the mean rate of annual growth falls by 0.24 
percentage point. Thus the fiscal deficit would explain growth better than volatiliy. 
The results of regressions 2 and 3 don’t square with the strong correlation found by 
Avila (2010) between country risk and growth. A possible clue to the puzzle might be the 
narrow scope of the index of volatility as compared to the wide scope of the country risk 
premium. Investors may take the fiscal-deficit figures as forecasts of crisis or violations of 
property rights (sovereign defaults, confiscations, devaluations, inflations, bank runs). That 
is, they may take the deficit as a proxy of the risks involved in sinking capital within the 
borders of the unstable country. So the fiscal deficit would have a significant impact upon 
growth because it is a better proxy to country-risk premium than the volatility of relative 
prices. 
As regards the causality between the fiscal deficit and growth, the results of the Granger 
test support the hypothesis that the deficit is the cause of growth and not the other way 
around, for lags of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 periods. 
As a last step in the analyses of data, Table 3 provides a comparison of the Argentine 
performance with that of a group of countries for the period 1974-85 (see next page). 
 
From the empirical evidence we conclude that: 
 
￿  There is a seemingly positive correlation between the fiscal deficit and the volatility of 
key macroeconomic prices, such as the real exchange rate and the real interest rate. The 
correlation appears closer in the historical series for Argentina than in the international 
comparison; the difference may be due to the fact that in Table 1 we use a more uniform 
measurement of the public sector deficit than in Table 3. 
￿  There is a negative correlation between volatility and economic growth. An exception 
to the rule is the 1946-58 period in Argentina, when in spite of large increases in the 
fiscal deficit and volatility, growth rose instead of falling. The cause of this unexpected 
performance was probably the sharp improvement in the terms of trade in 1948 and the 




Table 3: International Comparison, 1974-85 
   
Fiscal Deficit 
% of GDP 
Volatility   
Income per Capita  
Cumul. annual %  
Real Rate of 
Exchange 
Real Rate of 
Interest  
 Argentina      6.5  (3.2)         19.9         23.3            -1.3 
 Chile      0.1  (3.2)           5.1         11.3             0.6 
 Uruguay      2.9  (2.6)           7.6         10.3             0.6 
 USA      3.4  (1.6)           0.1           3.4             1.5 
 West Germany      2.0  (0.7)           3.6           2.2             2.1 
 Japan      6.1  (1.7)           1.0           3.6             3.2 
 Paraguay      0.1  (1.0)           2.4           7.6             2.9 
 Singapore     -1.4  (1.3)           0.3           2.9             5.9 
 South Korea      1.9  (0.8)           0.5           4.2             6.2 
 
Notes 
a) Fiscal deficit: simple annual average at Central Administration level. Respective standard 
deviation is shown in brackets. 
b) Volatility: measured in the same way as for Table 1. 
c) Growth in income per capita: idem. 
Source: Calculations based on IMF data (1987). 
 
￿  Countries or historical periods with good public finances are noted for low volatility in 
relative prices and high growth in per capita income. This is the case for Argentina in 
periods of relative stability (1915-28; 1933-45; 1959-72; 1991-2001; 2002-06), and for 
countries such as USA, West Germany and Japan, and even more clearly for Paraguay, 
Singapore and South Korea, in the period 1974-85. Countries or historical periods that 
show high (or unstable) deficit are noted for a significantly greater volatility. Argentina 
falls into this category in the period 1946-58 and especially that of 1973-90: unusually 
high volatility and a fall in per capita income without precedent. This context repeated 
itself, with less intensity, in Chile and Uruguay; both countries experienced a higher 
volatility than that observed in the other countries in the sample and very low growth. 
￿  The fiscal deficit measure used in Table 3 is the only one available for international 
comparisons, though it is not the most appropriate since it only covers the imbalance of 
the Central Administration. The problem becomes evident when comparing Argentina 
with Japan. While in Argentina the Central Administration deficit in the period 1974-85 
was approximately half the consolidated total, in Japan the strong deficit of the Central 
Administration was neutralized by the surplus in the provinces and the social security 
system,  so  that  the  consolidated  deficit  became  insignificant.  The  Chilean  case  is 
interesting: budget equilibrium coexists with high volatility; this observation contradicts 
our thesis. In this case, however, volatility is a consequence of an unstable deficit; the 
standard deviation of the Chilean deficit is similar to that for Argentina; in the period 
analyzed Chile frequently swung from large deficits to surpluses and vice-versa, forcing 
adjustments in relative prices that shortened the investor’s horizon. The Uruguayan case 
is similar to that of Chile, although more moderate. 
￿  In short, to extend the investor’s horizon and foster growth both variables are important: 
the mean size of the fiscal deficit and its degree of stability. This assertion carries with it  
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an implicit causality judgement: fiscal deficit causes volatility, and volatility causes low 
growth. Though it is possible to speculate on the existence of a hidden variable the 
fluctuations of which dominate the relationship between deficit and growth (such as the 
terms of trade), we should remember that the deficit seems to be the cause of growth in 
the Argentine time series. 
 
II. A Rationale 
 
The Australian model, quite popular in the literature on open-economy macroeconomics in 
the 70s and 80s, represents fairly well the setting we have in mind. According to the model, 
the country’s economy is a) small and open, so it takes as given the prices of exportable and 
importable goods, and the risk-free interest rate; b) the country is populated by individuals 
who produce and consume traded goods (exportable and importable) and non-traded goods 
(services); c) individuals hold their wealth in local currency, foreign bonds, and fixed local 
capital; d) risk aversion explains why individuals spread wealth among those assets; e) the 
fiscal deficit is financed by means of foreign borrowing or inflation tax; f) individuals have 
rational expectations and incomplete information on the future course of economic policy 
(deficit size and way of financing it). 
 
Deficit and Volatility 
 
Assume the fiscal deficit starts to be financed by foreign debt. How does the economy 
adjust to such innovation? Foreign debt leads to an increase in aggregate demand and a rise 
in the price of the domestic good to ration its supply. The budget innovation leads in this 
way to a fall in the real-exchange rate.
2 As the horizon for foreign borrowing gets short and 
agents forecast the return of the inflation tax, the country bears a higher real-interest rate, 
besides currency overvaluation. The jump in the interest rate can be attributed to a change 
in expectations on the rate of currency devaluation. Agents expect that the substitution of 
the inflation tax for foreign borrowing will make the nominal-exchange rate rise faster than 
the price level, so that the real-exchange rate recovers the level it had before the first budget 
innovation. The opposite scenario (higher real-exchange rate or currency undervaluation, 
and lower real-interest rate) prevails when the deficit is financed by the inflation tax. This 
budget cycle helps to explain the history of inflation and current-account adjustments that 
Argentina underwent in the second half of the 20
th century. The bulk of financing swung 
from one source to another. In the 70s and 80s this phenomenon got stronger as the deficit 
literally exploded.
3 We think this may be the origin of the volatility in relative prices. The 
index of volatility reached high levels in the 1946-58 period and very high levels in the 
1974-85 period. 
 
Volatility and Investment 
 
                                                 
2 Argentine evidence since the 70s seems to indicate that the private sector behaves as if it does not discount 
future tax liabilities. 
3 On the relative importance of each source (money creation, domestic debt bonds and foreign loans) see 
Cavallo and Peña (1983). A budget vision of the Argentine-economy progress and reversals can be found in 
FIEL (1989).  
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Risk aversion is a key factor in capital markets. It is a consequence of the hypothesis of 
decreasing marginal utility of income. According to this hypothesis, the expected value of a 
lottery with 50% chance of winning $100 and 50% chance of losing $100 is zero, while its 
expected utility is negative because the disutility of losing $100 is greater than the utility of 
winning $100. The difference between the utility of not intervening in the lottery and the 
expected utility of intervening is the welfare loss borne by the investor who leaves a safe 
position to embark on a project with an uncertain outcome. It accounts for the maximum 
premium he would pay to keep his wealth unchanged. 
The peculiar way through which the volatility in relative prices filters into the process 
of capital accumulation should be now evident. A project for sinking capital into Argentina 
would bear a turbulence of relative prices thirty times greater than that for the same project 
in South Korea. Therefore, the risk premium for investing in Argentina will have to be 
several times higher than the South Korean risk-premium. In weighing the possibility of 
investing physically in Argentina, investors who live in New York or Buenos Aires will 
behave in identical fashion. Given a 10 year-US Treasury bond that yields 4% per year, a 
project with a return of 12%, excellent in the environment of security and predictability of 
the European Union or Canada, in Argentina would be quickly discarded as loss. Think of 
the fate of a project for industrial exports during the great revaluation in real terms of the 
peso in 1979-80, or the fate of a non-tradable project during the great depreciation in real 
terms of the 80s. Consider further the fortune of any such firms when they have to go 
month after month through an anti-inflation program with real rates of interest at 4% per 
month. The instability of important relative prices is too high in Argentina for the average 
investor to be attracted by an anual 12% return. During the 80s investors required a 22% 
average return per year on projects to be carried out in Argentina under Argentine law, or a 
quick  recovery  of  the  capital  invested.  Without  an  insurance  against  macroeconomic 
instability, investors self-insure demanding from their projects the opportunity cost of the 
funds to be sunk (the interest yield on a long US Treasury bond) plus a risk premium which 
for Argentina at that time was about 15% per year. Thus lots of projects that would have 
contributed greatly to the national wealth were discarded until the horizon improves. 
 
III. Concluding Remarks 
 
The fiscal deficit seems to be an important restriction to economic growth in Argentina. Yet 
macroeconomic uncertainty, a concept we identify with the volatility of key relative prices, 
doesn’t show up as a significant link between the deficit and growth. The narrow scope of 
the volatiliy index we have used in the paper, as opposed to the wide scope of the modern 
index for the Argentine-risk premium, may be a possible explanation of such a result. Think 
that the country-risk premium captures not only the above mentioned volatility but also the 
likelihood of a long list of events that certainly hinder capital accumulation in the country: 
sovereign default, confiscation, nationalization, bank run, bank lock-out, big devaluation, 
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Argentina: Per capita GDP Growth Rate, Real Exchange Rate, and Fiscal Deficit (1913-
2008) 
 
  Growth Rate  Real Exchange Rate  Fiscal Deficit 
1913   -6,2  42,8  0,6 
1914   -15,5  42,9  4,3 
1915   5,1  39,7  3,5 
1916   -7,2  45,0  2,4 
1917   -15,2  51,0  4,6 
1918   24,4  44,4  0,7 
1919   -0,4  51,2  0,1 
1920   0,1  53,9  -1,3 
1921   0,9  47,2  1,3 
1922   7,5  49,2  2,5 
1923   6,2  54,6  0,0 
1924   5,1  52,3  0,9 
1925   -7,0  48,4  -0,5 
1926   3,5  47,9  3,4 
1927   4,9  44,2  1,8 
1928   -2,3  44,3  0,3 
1929   -1,7  44,6  2,7 
1930   -10,5  45,9  3,7 
1931   0,3  56,8  0,8 
1932   -5,3  63,6  4,9 
1933   0,6  47,5  1,3 
1934   6,6  74,3  1,4 
1935   10,6  72,3  -1,0 
1936   -5,6  63,6  3,0 
1937   5,4  61,2  4,0 
1938   -1,4  66,0  4,2 
1939   2,2  70,5  5,0 
1940   0,0  70,8  4,4 
1941   3,5  74,5  7,6 
1942   -0,5  79,4  2,4 
1943   -2,3  79,3  1,9 
1944   9,4  78,8  6,0 
1945   -4,8  67,2  4,4 
1946   7,1  66,2  8,2 
1947   9,2  79,2  11,6 
1948   3,3  116,9  15,6 
1949   -3,7  142,2  11,7 
1950   -2,4  160,7  6,8 
1951   1,7  194,0  5,2 
1952   -6,9  131,4  5,8 
1953   3,3  122,6  10,0  
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1954   2,2  132,8  9,5 
1955   5,1  142,4  8,3 
1956   0,9  151,6  5,2 
1957   3,4  139,4  6,3 
1958   4,3  135,9  9,3 
1959   -8,0  101,5  2,7 
1960   6,1  82,8  2,7 
1961   5,4  72,5  3,6 
1962   -3,1  80,7  3,6 
1963   -3,9  76,3  4,1 
1964   8,6  71,1  5,0 
1965   7,5  87,4  3,5 
1966   -0,8  68,0  2,7 
1967   1,2  73,8  3,4 
1968   2,8  64,4  1,7 
1969   7,0  65,1  0,9 
1970   3,8  65,4  1,8 
1971   2,1  79,6  3,1 
1972   0,4  98,7  3,7 
1973   2,0  68,2  7,6 
1974   3,6  93,9  8,1 
1975   -2,2  158,8  16,1 
1976   -1,6  109,1  13,6 
1977   4,7  68,8  8,3 
1978   -4,8  51,4  10,3 
1979   5,2  36,8  8,3 
1980   0,0  29,0  6,2 
1981   -6,9  51,2  10,4 
1982   -4,7  116,7  21,4 
1983   2,5  115,8  22,9 
1984   0,4  92,2  22,0 
1985   -8,4  96,3  11,6 
1986   5,5  74,1  7,8 
1987   1,0  86,8  15,3 
1988   -3,4  80,6  19,0 
1989   -8,3  110,4  21,2 
1990   -2,8  49,7  9,0 
1991   9,4  36,7  1,4 
1992   9,2  30,9  0,5 
1993   5,2  28,5  -0,4 
1994   7,0  27,5  0,9 
1995   -5,8  27,2  1,8 
1996   3,0  27,8  2,5 
1997   7,1  27,8  1,5 
1998   2,7  27,3  2,0 
1999   -4,5  28,1  3,1 
2000   -1,8  29,5  3,6  
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2001   -5,4  30,4  5,4 
2002   -11,9  74,8  2,3 
2003   7,8  64,4  -0,9 
2004   8,2  63,6  -3,8 
2005   8,1  60,3  -2,3 
2006   7,3  58,7  -2,0 
2007   6,7  -  0,3 
2008   3,2  -  -0,2 
Sources: 1) Up to 1979, calculations are based on data from 
IEERAL (1986); from then on, based on Argentina’s national 
income accounts. 2) Fiscal deficit data for periods 1991-2001 
and 2002-06 taken from Espert & Associates. 3) Data on per 
capita income taken from Avila (1998) up to 1997; from then 
on, estimated according to national income accounts. 
Notes: 1) Observations are not averages. They are simply the 
fiscal deficit, the growth rate or the real exchange rate that 
correspond to each year. 2) For fiscal deficit we mean global 
or financial Public Sector deficit. 3) The real exchange rate is 
equal to the nominal exchange rate times the US WPI divided 
by the Argentine CPI. 4) There is no real exchange rate data 
for years 2007 and 2008 due to lack of reliable official data 
for consumer inflation. 
 